Chalcedon · 451
“The Definition of the Synod at Chalcedon.” A ὅρος was a boundary stone marking the edge of a field. The councils used the word for a doctrinal definition, which sets limits within which the church confesses Christ. The Definition does not explain how Christ is God and man; it fences off the ways of getting it wrong.
The Definition of Chalcedon, AD 451, in Greek, Latin and English
Tap a word to light up its counterparts and open its parsing, New Testament usage, dictionary entries and Reformed echoes. Drag the column names to reorder the languages.
How the Reformation confessions took up Chalcedon’s language. Tap an underlined phrase to see the words of the Definition behind it; tap a word in the Definition to find the confessions that echo it.
Three modern studies, each read against the Definition above. Page references are to the printed articles.
Themelios 3.2 (January 1978), 2–9. Bray answers the two standing charges: that the Definition imposes Greek philosophy on Scripture, and that it is docetic. His case is that its logic comes from the New Testament.
“Chalcedon did not adopt philosophy: it took some basic philosophical words and forged a theology based on Scripture. Its logic is a systematization of the logic inherent in Scripture, not a philosophical corruption of primitive texts.”
On the central phrase, he notes that the Definition says Christ is “made known in two natures” and does not say how:
“Chalcedon contented itself with the mystery that Jesus was one person ‘made known in two natures’.”
Against the charge of docetism, he argues that the humanity serves the revelation of God. Leo’s “impersonal” humanity means only that Jesus was never a mere man, and “was not a split personality”. And of Robinson’s functional christology:
“The Chalcedonian position is nothing like this—Jesus’ humanity in orthodox thought is not a barrier but a means to the perception of God.”
Theology Digest 53:4 (Winter 2006), 345–56 (PDF). Weinandy first reads the Definition closely. It says “one and the same” three times and “the same” five times, and from that he concludes:
“There is only one subject or person; there is only one ‘who,’ and that one ‘who’ is the one Son or Word of God.”Weinandy, 346
From this he draws three truths that any later christology must keep:
“First, it is truly the Son of God who is man. … Second, it is truly man that the Son of God is. … Third, the Son of God truly is man.”Weinandy, 347
He then applies them. On method, christology is ontologically “from above” (the Son assumes a human nature) and epistemologically “from below” (we know who he is through his human words and deeds). On miracles, an act such as raising Lazarus is one the Son performs as man:
“Miracles are what is traditionally termed ‘theandric’ actions, that is, divine deeds done humanly.”Weinandy, 349
On suffering, it is the Son who suffers, in his human nature:
“…what is redemptive is not that the Son of God suffered as God, but that he truly suffered as man.”Weinandy, 350
And on the person of Christ, “person” names a “who” and not a missing extra part. Jesus has a full human body, mind and will, but his identity is the Son’s (352–53).
In Davie et al. (eds), New Dictionary of Theology: Historical and Systematic, 177–78. Highton is brief about what the Definition does not do:
“Chalcedon did not offer a coherent metaphysical theory of how this unity-in-distinction was possible, but rather laid down a set of parameters and provided a language that allows the emphases of both sides to be articulated.”Highton, 177
That fits the ὅρος at the top of this page: a boundary, with the four adverbs marking its edges. He also sets out the two technical terms behind “one Person and one Subsistence”. Christ’s human life has no reality of its own outside the union (anhypostasia) and is given its reality only in and by it (enhypostasia).